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Brexit and Its Impact on Poland’s Policy Towards 
Europe – An Attempt to Forecast
Abstract
Brexit has betrayed the disadvantages of the European project along with 
the fact that European institutions have no desire to conduct deeper 
reforms. Brexit cannot be considered without the stance that the British 
have developed not only in the last few years but generally over the period 
of its integration with continental Europe. A study shows the political 
consequences of the UK’s exit from the European Union alog with the 
potential scenarios of Poland’s European policy in the next 2–3 years. 
This article presents three scenarios for the development of Poland's 
European policy, i.e. the British scenario, a conservative scenario and a 
pro-European scenario. In addition, this article aims to show the potential 
activities of the Polish government in the context of selected scenarios for 
the development of the situation in Europe. Currently, the most likely is 
the British scenario, where the Polish government concentrates on those 
areas of integration that are important to it. The European Union will 
be treated by Poland as an economic organization providing access to 
the common European market as well as political support in the event of 
disputes with the powers. The adoption of the British scenario by Poland 
assumes an evolutionary drift towards polexit. The least realistic choice 
of scenario is the strongly pro-European approach. This would require a 
total change in Poland's European policy strategy and the abandoning of 
internal reforms.
Keywords: European Union, Brexit, Poland, Policy, Europe 
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Introduction
The fi nal decision of the UK to leave the European Union has set many 
important tasks for political decision-makers in Europe. One of them is 
not to lead to greater divisions on the Old Continent, and, consequently, 
perhaps to the collapse of the European Union. Many experts wrote about 
possible collapse of the EU even before the Brexit referendum itself, and 
before the formal decision of Britain to leave European family.1 However, 
in current situation the EU member states and its institutions have nothing 
left to do but pursue active policy towards greater integration. It should 
be remembered and emphasized that the Brexit process also has certain 
negative consequences for European integration. It is not said at all that 
British decision in the long run will not be the beginning of clear and, 
more importantly, further formal disintegration processes as a result of 
which some EU member states will lose the sense of their membership in 
this organization. It cannot be assumed that for all countries the European 
Union is the highest good that Europe has given Europe and it will last 
forever. However, it is currently diffi cult to conclude if a single event, 
such as the UK’s exit from the EU, will lead to a signifi cant deepening 
of disintegration, or maybe it will be just one of the cornerstones of this 
process or even its collapse. It seems that the implementation of any of 
these scenarios will have the greatest consequences for countries such as 
Poland, which, on the one hand, have gained a lot thanks to membership 
in the European Union but also could lose a lot if there was a clear 
deepening of disintegration, or even its fi nal breakup . By the way, various 
development scenarios should be taken into account, including those 
presented by Ian Kearns, who writes about Europe after the European 
Union and potential effects of disintegration in Collapse: Europe After The 
European Union.2 Therefore, it is worth taking a look at several issues that 
raise a number of doubts. In my opinion, we should think about whether 
it is possible that the exit of the UK is an insignifi cant event and at the 
1  More on this: W.J. Thies, Is the EU Collapsing?, „International Studies Review”, 
vol. 14, no. 2 (June 2012), pp. 225–239; J.M. Fiszer, Unia Europejska dziś i jej niepewna 
przyszłość. Część I (The European Union today and its uncertain future. Part I.), „Rocznik 
Integracji Europejskiej”, no. 9/2015, pp. 39–55; W. Orłowski, Scenariusze rozwoju Unii 
Europejskiej w kontekście zmian globalnych (European Union development scenarios 
in the context of global changes), in: Unia Europejska. Dylematy XXI wieku (European 
Union. 21st century dilemmas), eds. A. Kukliński, J. Woźniak, Urząd Marszałkowski 
Województwa Małopolskiego, Kraków 2011; M. Dahl, Y. Skomorokhova, The Balance of 
Power in the European Union after Brexit, „Studia Europaea” 2017.
2  More on this: I. Kearns, Collapse: Europe After The European Union, Biteback 
Publishing, London 2018.
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same time something that was simply expected? It is obvious that the 
country has always been looking for something different in Europe and 
interests or political visions regarding the form of cooperation differed 
with the ideas and thoughts of European supporters of integration. So 
why does a country like Poland, in which 89% of the population supports 
membership in the European Union,3 at some point choose Britain as the 
main partner in European politics, and what was the goal in the context of 
our membership in the EU? Finally, what consequences does Brexit have 
and will have for Poland and its European policy in the future?
The purpose of the study is to attempt to show Poland’s potential place 
in the European Union in connection with Brexit and to analyze the 
development of future integration processes in Europe.
Political Consequences of Brexit for the European Union
Most experts make an effort to determine the consequences of Brexit 
for the European Union, which is the most obvious and common task. 
However, one should reverse this trend and fi rst ask a deceitful question: 
was/is Britain’s departure from the European Union a surprise, and should 
it be a one? Should the European Union and its member states be prepared 
for it in any way? Analyzing the entire membership process, whether in 
the European Communities or later in the European Union, it is diffi cult 
to fi nd a longer period in which Britain would think continentally 
when it came to the process of European integration. Starting from 
Winston Churchill, who spoke about the UK as a link between the US 
and Europe, through the hard and decisive policy of Margaret Thatcher 
rebuilding the importance and independence of the country. Then the 
“Third Way” of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and ultimately David 
Cameron, who advocated integration with continental Europe but in 
the British sense of the word it is diffi cult to clearly characterize British 
activity in the process of European integration. What is meant by this? 
In the British perspective, Europe seems to be only a tool for a specifi c 
purpose. However, this objective has specifi c limits, such as the level 
of social acceptance for deeper integration with continental Europe. 
Hence, throughout all the years of its presence in European integration 
structures, British concentration has been focused on common market 
issues and the benefi ts/losses it was bringing for the economy. Political 
relations were only the “casing” of the extremely instrumental treatment 
of the European Union, while not being strongly committed to the idea of 
3  Postrzeganie Unii Europejskiej i jej instytucji (Perception of the European Union 
and its institutions), „Komunikat z badań CBOS”, no. 32/2020, p. 1.
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creating something more (e.g. deepening cooperation in EU foreign and 
security policy) than just a common market for the benefi t of London. 
Although British politicians like David Cameron were saying: “I am 
not a British isolationist”, this isolationism was at the heart of British 
membership. Therefore, the decision to withdraw from the EU was not 
(or at least should not be) a surprise for EU politicians. Furthermore, 
the EU and its decision-makers should be very well prepared for it. Were 
they really? The period of turbulent divorce negotiations confi rmed that 
they were not. It might seem that after 2004 European leaders lost their 
strategic instinct: instead of planning future processes, they focused on 
the here and now integration process. Too much was devoted to new 
and defi ant member states, such as Poland or Hungary, and too little to 
planning the vision of European integration in the perspective of 15–20 
years. It has been forgotten, or underestimated that European integration 
is not a state but a process that does not have to take only one positive 
direction of development. It can be said that the British brutally verifi ed 
the EU’s preparation for future challenges, seriously opening an in-depth 
discussion about the further meaning of the existence of the European 
project, even if some member states, such as Germany or France, clearly 
rejected the consequences of the British referendum for the EU.
Undoubtedly, the effects of the 2016 referendum in the United 
Kingdom were, however, a shock for the entire European Union and its 
member states. Hardly anyone allowed for the possibility of fi nal vote for 
the British to leave the European Union. Since then, many experts and 
commentators have tried to show possible consequences of this decision 
for both the British side and the European Union as an international 
organization. Starting from the general consequences of Brexit for the 
EU and the entire European integration process, one key element should 
be emphasized, which, in fact, was not specifi cally mentioned in the EU 
narrative until 2016. The result of the referendum and the subsequent 
effects of EU-British negotiations have shown that European integration is 
a two-way process and, what is important, a completely reversible process. 
Until the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, no one in practice thought that 
any country could leave the EU, even the UK, despite its open criticism 
of the European project. After 2009, when the well-known article 50 was 
included in the Treaty on European Union, it was realized in the EU that 
this is legally possible, but hardly anyone thought that it was practically 
feasible. David Cameron’s assumption of the offi ce of Prime Minister of 
the UK in May 2010 and related announcements of the referendum were 
also not taken too seriously by European politicians. Nevertheless, we can 
say that his speech of 23 January 2013, in which he initiated the referendum, 
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was the beginning of reversing the process of European integration, despite 
the fact that David Cameron himself did not quite want to lead the UK 
to the withdrawal from the EU. His statement makes one think that it 
was a kind of defense of British membership in the European Union by 
indicating the directions of necessary changes in the process of European 
integration. He said: “(…) there are 3 major challenges confronting us 
today. First, the problems in the Eurozone are driving fundamental change 
in Europe. Second, there is a crisis of European competitiveness, as other 
nations across the world soar ahead. And third, there is a gap between 
the EU and its citizens which has grown dramatically in recent years. 
And which represents a lack of democratic accountability and consent 
that is – yes – felt particularly acutely in Britain. If we don’t address these 
challenges, the danger is that Europe will fail and the British people will 
drift towards the exit. I do not want that to happen. I want the European 
Union to be a success. And I want a relationship between Britain and 
the EU that keeps us in it”.4 Prime Minister Cameron drew attention to 
the fundamental problems of the European Union but considered them 
not from the point of view of the EU as an international organization, 
but from the perspective of a member state and the consequences related 
to further drift of the integration process. The reversal of the European 
integration process in this context referred to the need to adapt/repair/
modify it to the expectations of a member state, whereas the art. 50 TEU 
was a legal instrument for its practical implementation. In this context, 
Brexit has opened the door to other EU member states to leave it. In 
a situation where the state claims that integration process is going the 
wrong way, and it can’t be fi xed, the state makes the best decision for itself 
– it either stays in the EU or leaves it. 
Let us note that by their decision the British basically doubted the 
sense of the existence of the nearly 60-year integration process counting 
from the Treaties of Rome of March 25, 1957. This whole context creates 
a certain danger and also long-term consequences for the European 
Union. The art. 50 assumes that “any Member State may decide to 
withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements”. Pursuant to this provision, it is a member state that 
initiates the EU withdrawal. In this spirit, it can be poetically stated that 
the British “consumed the forbidden fruit and broke a kind of integration 
taboo”, which was the widespread belief in the necessity and need to 
remain in the European Union. The exit of the United Kingdom from 
the European Union may therefore be (though not necessarily) a kind of 
4  EU speech at Bloomberg, UK government’s website, https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg (access 10.04.2020).
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a snowball for further disintegration processes in Europe. According to, 
among others Józef M. Fiszer “Brexit will weaken the European Union 
and inhibit integration processes in Europe. Anti-EU and Eurosceptic 
sentiment will increase, consisting in criticism of the European Union 
and strong opposition to it”.5 Another possible consequence may be 
the acceleration of the so-called differentiated integration. Of these two 
potential effects of the British withdrawal from the EU, the latter, which 
is differentiated integration, is defi nitely a better solution. As Agnieszka 
K. Cianciara writes, “the goal of differentiated integration is to deal 
with the diversity of Member States’ priorities and to avoid political 
deadlock (...) and diversity does not mean the failure of the integration 
project as such”.6 Analyzing the development of the European integration 
process since the biggest enlargement in history on May 1, 2004, it might 
seem that the mentioned diversity of member states’ priorities is much 
bigger than before that date. This is primarily due to the background 
of some countries that joined the European Union in 2004 and in the 
following years. The future consequences of Brexit for the EU and the 
entire integration process should not be considered without taking into 
account the specifi cities of individual member states and, importantly, 
their attitude to changes in the EU. There is a group of member states 
that relatively critically refers to the directions in which the process of 
European integration is heading. It is not only Poland or Hungary, but 
also Italy that accuses the EU of helplessness during the migration crisis, 
and later the lack of proper coordination between member states on the 
fi ght against the Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting consequences for 
this country.7 Therefore, potential future consequences of Brexit must 
be considered in a much broader context than just the UK’s withdrawal 
from the European Union. The dynamics of international processes, not 
only regional but also global challenges, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, 
and in a moment also social dissatisfaction with its consequences such as, 
for example, the inevitable rise in unemployment, may only deepen the 
doubts of other member states on the formula of cooperation that the EU 
has adopted. This, in turn, can be a catalyst for loosening the integration 
5  J.M. Fiszer, Szanse i zagrożenia dla Unii Europejskiej po brexicie. Implikacje dla 
Polski (Opportunities and threats for the European Union after Brexit. Implications for 
Poland), „Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna”, no. 4/2017, p. 225.
6  A.K. Cianciara, W poszukiwaniu alternatywnych modeli integracji: Europa jako 
klub klubów (In search of alternative integration models: Europe as a club of clubs), 
„Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna”, no. 4/2015, pp. 167–168.
7  J. Szymańska, M. Szczepanik, Reakcja Unii Europejskiej na epidemię korona wirusa 
(The European Union’s response to the Covid 19 epidemic), „Biuletyn PISM”, March 17, 
2020.
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process, especially considering that Britain has already shown the way. It 
should be taken into account that there are enough reasons for the revival 
of national egoisms in Europe, because in some member states not much 
is needed to change the attitude of government towards EU membership, 
or at least change the offi cial rhetoric.
The UK has shown EU member states that there is a way to withdraw 
from the organization partly on its own terms. It initiated the process 
of destruction of the European Union. However, this does not mean 
the beginning of the end of European integration process, which was 
mentioned in the introduction, at the moment its modifi cation, at most. 
In fact, much will depend on the arrangement of EU-British relations 
over the next 3–5 years. As we know, there are several scenarios for their 
formation, starting from the Norwegian model, through the Swiss, the 
Turkish and the free-trade area. At the moment, the Swiss model would be 
the most favorable cooperation model for both the UK and the European 
Union. Its essence is bilateral agreements regulating Britain’s access to 
the EU’s common market divided into its sectors. Observing the divorce 
negotiations, it is diffi cult to suppose that one and comprehensive free 
trade agreement between the UK and the European Union establishing 
free trade area could be signed. The development of this new model of 
cooperation and its practical application by both parties will undoubtedly 
be of interest to EU member states, and not only because of the benefi ts/
losses it brings for their national economies. It will also be a kind of 
experimental fi eld for some of them in the event of such decisions like the 
one made by the British in 2016. It should not be considered a priori that 
the UK’s exit was a one-off event (although it can be anyway), which will 
not be repeated more often. Furthermore, only now the member states will 
begin the actual game to take Britain’s place, or obviously to strengthen 
their position. It applies to both big and most infl uential countries, such 
as Germany and France, but also to countries such as Poland, which are 
still looking for their place in the European Union.
Brexit and Poland: Scenarios of Poland’s 
European Policy Development
The open secret is that as soon as Britain withdrew from the European 
Union, an intra-EU game about taking its place began. This process is 
currently being slowed down by the global Covid-19 pandemic as the 
member states primarily focus on reducing its effects. In addition, the 
period of divorce negotiations between London and Brussels was not the 
most appropriate time for political skirmishes and attempts to take over 
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the legacy after the British. Different member states adopted different 
attitudes over this period. In all this, Poland’s attitude was very puzzling. 
Before the British referendum, in the words of the former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Witold Waszczykowski in 2016, Poland chose Britain as the 
main ally in European politics. According to the minister it was necessary 
to “maintain the dialogue and regular consultations at various levels with 
the most important European partners – fi rst of all with Britain, with 
which we share not only the understanding of many important elements 
of the European agenda, but also a similar approach to the problems of 
European security”.8 The decision taken by the British a few months after 
this speech by Minister Waszyczykowski was undoubtedly a big strike to 
Polish foreign policy. It also exposed unrefl ective decisions made within 
it and the lack of a proper “diagnosis” of international developments by 
the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given the timing of the turn in 
the policy towards Europe, which is also related to the change of power 
in Poland and its takeover by the coalition of the United Right and 
President Andrzej Duda, it clearly showed what Polish activity in the 
European Union would look like. However, the British decision not 
only quickly verifi ed the assumptions of the Polish government, but also 
signifi cantly reduced Poland’s alliance capabilities on the EU forum. 
Both Warsaw and London were supporters of the intergovernmental 
nature of EU cooperation, i.e. de facto a strong strengthening of the role 
of nation states in the entire decision-making process of the European 
Union. Both capitals were also relatively distrustful of the activities of 
the European Commission and loudly demanded changes in the way the 
European Union was managed, proposing, among others increasing the 
role of national parliaments. With the United Kingdom departure from 
the EU, Poland lost its powerful “intergovernmental” ally, which was 
the second EU economy and a key country in terms of the EU military 
potential.
It is also important to realize that Brexit has led to a real change in the 
balance of power in the decision-making process in the European Union, 
with Germany and France being its biggest benefi ciaries.9 Strengthening 
German domination in Europe, while weakening the further process of 
European integration as a result of deepening internal problems is certainly 
not good news for Europe, but also for Poland, which is still at the stage 
8  Information of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy in 2016.
9  More on this: M. Kleinowski, The impact of Brexit on the member states’ ability 
to build blocking coalitions in the Council, „Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne”, 
no. 2/2019, pp. 5–27; J. Szymańska, Sz. Zaręba, Wpływ brexitu na głosowanie w Radzie 
UE (The impact of Brexit on voting in the EU Council), „Biuletyn PISM”, 8.04.2019.
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of catching up with European leaders. As we know, not all decisions taken 
in the European Union have so far been benefi cial to us. In the situation 
of Brexit, it will be extremely diffi cult for Polish authorities to fi nd, for 
example, a number of member states to build a blocking coalition, or to 
push their arguments in the relations between the eurozone and non-
eurozone countries. Regardless, the authorities in Warsaw will be forced to 
choose a specifi c strategy for participating in European politics. The time 
for a new balance of power in Europe is also time for changes in Poland’s 
European policy and in the next 2–3 years it will be necessary to clearly 
defi ne our attitude in the European Union and answer the question: why 
are we in the European Union and what do we want to achieve? At the 
moment there are three potential scenarios for shaping Poland’s policy 
toward Europe, i.e.
1. British scenario,
2. conservative scenario, 
3. pro-European scenario.
The British scenario of Poland’s policy towards Europe would amount 
to concentration by the Polish government on the integration areas 
that are only important for Warsaw, i.e. cohesion policy, or agricultural 
policy. In this scenario, the European Union will be treated by Poland 
as an economic organization allowing access to the common European 
market, as well as political support in the event of disputes with the 
superpowers such as with the Russian Federation. This assumption, 
however, is burdened with some disadvantages, especially if we mention 
the possibility of the Polish government’s impact on EU decision-making 
process. The Polish government’s involvement in the disintegration 
process is followed by national egoism and concern primarily for its own 
national interest, and thus weakening the impact on common market 
decisions. The disadvantage of this strategy is the further widening of 
the gap between the Eurozone and the other member states. In Poland, 
there are no prospects for the adoption of the single currency in the long 
term, so the British model of European policy, naturally, taking into 
account the differences in the potential between London and Warsaw 
and the possibility of infl uencing the course of European affairs, will only 
push Poland down the European ladder of infl uential member states. 
The British had specifi c arguments at the EU forum, such as a strong 
economy or military potential, while Poland has no such arguments, or 
they are defi nitely weaker. The same applies to external relations and the 
aforementioned policy towards Russia. It can be assumed with a very high 
probability that in the era when the economic crisis is beginning, Germany 
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and France will work more actively to reduce the sanctions imposed on 
Russia or even lift them completely. The goal of these countries will be to 
stimulate economic cooperation to the maximum level. In this situation, 
Poland will have to meet a completely new task (the question of whether 
it wants to), which is to fi nd an effective way to infl uence the European 
Union’s policy towards the Russian Federation, so as not to lose too much 
on deepening cooperation between the largest EU Member States and 
this country. Given the skills Poland has in terms of forming coalitions, 
especially among the so-called leading countries in the EU, this prospect 
is not very promising. On the other hand, from a political perspective, the 
adoption of the British model of European policy would actually assume 
the accumulation of actions aimed at limiting the role of Germany and 
France, which, with the increase in their importance in the EU decision-
making system, would be very diffi cult, and might complicate Poland’s 
position in the Union. Adoption of the British scenario by Poland 
assumes evolutionary drift towards Polexit. The British road to leave the 
EU was also evolutionary, and one of its main instruments was criticism 
of the way the EU operated and increasing interference in the internal 
affairs of the member states, and fi nally the reluctance of some citizens 
to the essence of membership. In Poland, only the last issue is for the 
time being a clear obstacle to starting a discussion on loosening Polish 
ties with the EU. In Poland, an additional determinant may be domestic 
policy and, for example, EU restrictions on the state of the rule of law in 
Poland and the related transfer of European funds in accordance with the 
principle of “money for the rule of law”.10 It also seems that the moment 
when the implementation of the British model in Polish European policy 
accelerates will be the change of Poland’s position from a net benefi ciary 
to a net contributor to the EU budget. 
The second possible scenario, which is more conservative, assumes that 
Poland will wait out the diffi culties in Europe and in the world related 
to the Covid-19 pandemic in the next 2–3 years. In this scenario, the 
concentration of governments in Poland would be aimed at eliminating 
the economic effects of the pandemic without further reforming the 
internal policy and not provoking European institutions to undertake 
drastic, including fi nancial actions against Warsaw. In this scenario, 
Poland would stop criticizing European institutions and calm the voices 
10  T. Bielecki, Spór o praworządność i budżet w Radzie UE. Ustępstwa wobec Polski 
nie spodobały się niektórym ministrom (Dispute over the rule of law and budget in the 
Council of the EU. Some ministers did not like concessions to Poland), „Gazeta Wyborcza”, 
18.02.2020.
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calling for the need for moral renewal of the EU11 in order to obtain 
the greatest possible organizational and fi nancial support saving the 
economy and the workplace. Besides, the European Union itself creates 
instruments to encourage greater activity of member states in the fi ght 
against pandemics. The examples are the European Social Fund Plus 
(ESF +), which would also fi nance health care programs,12 or the recent 
decision to provide Poland with nearly EUR 13 billion to protect health 
and jobs. The adoption of the conservative scenario of European policy 
would result from a pragmatic balance of profi ts and losses. Essentially, it 
is one of the most realistic concepts for the near future. 
The last and at the same time the least realistic of the scenarios is 
that Poland will completely change the strategy of conducting European 
policy from confrontational or conservative to a more active and pro-
integration one, while maintaining a realistic approach to the activities of 
European institutions. In this situation, the authorities in Warsaw would 
have to completely abandon reforms carried out in internal policy, which 
in principle would be admitting the mistake and agreeing with European 
institutions, e.g. on the rule of law in Poland. It would also require changes 
in the legal provisions of internal law in Poland introduced in recent 
years, which were objected by European institutions as well as selected 
member states, such as France. In this scenario, Poland would basically 
have to return to the European policy model from 2007–2015, i.e. building 
a coalition in the EU based on Berlin and France. In this context, it would 
be real for Poland to take Britain’s place in the European Union and thus 
enter the fi rst league of member states and have real infl uence on the 
decisions-making process. However, this would mean a total negation 
of the achievements of 2015–2020 in Polish internal and foreign policy. 
In the context of current political conditions in Poland, this scenario is 
actually impossible to implement. The complete change of direction of 
the policy towards Europe is possible only as a result of change of political 
11  Such slogans appeared, i.a. in the context of Hungary and Poland’s cooperation on 
the forum of the Visegrad Group, more on this: A. Chojan, Grupa Wyszehradzka w polityce 
zagranicznej Polski – między współpracą a rywalizacją (The Visegrad Group in Poland’s 
foreign policy – between cooperation and competition), „Biuletyn Zakładu Europeistyki 
ISP PAN”, no. 4/2016; A. Chojan, Polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa UE z perspek-
tywy państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej (EU Foreign and Security Policy from the perspective 
of the Visegrad Group countries), in: Globalna Strategia na rzecz Polityki Zagranicznej 
i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej – wybrane aspekty i uwarunkowania (Global Strategy 
for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy – selected aspects and conditions), 
ed. M.J. Tomaszyk, Wydawnictwo Naukowe WNPiD UAM, Poznań 2017.
12  Zdrowie a fundusze strukturalne (Health and Structural Funds), Komisja Europej-
ska, https://ec.europa.eu/health/funding/future_health_budget_pl (access 10.04.2020).
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groups ruling Poland through democratic elections, and thus not earlier 
than in three years.
Conclusions
Brexit is both an opportunity and a challenge for the European Union 
and its member states. In the context of the member states it is particularly 
important for countries such as Poland, which from a formal and legal 
point of view lost, when the British left the Union, and their position has 
weakened comparing to the biggest countries. Each of the member states 
must redefi ne its strategy in the EU. We can already see some capitals 
trying to take Britain’s place. It is said that the “dark horse” of these intra-
EU games may be the Netherlands, especially since some of the companies 
that had their headquarters in Britain are moving to the Netherlands13. In 
the context of Poland, it must be clearly stated that Warsaw does not use 
Brexit to strengthen its position in the EU, or move to a higher level in 
the decision-making process. In 2016 Poland made a mistake and focused 
on relations with the UK. Along with the subsequent “support” of the 
British in divorce negotiations, it will basically close Warsaw’s possibility 
of participating in the division of “trophies” in the European Union. 
Nevertheless, the authorities in Poland will have to quickly determine 
how to pursue policy towards Europe already in post-Brexit political 
reality in Europe, primarily for the benefi t of the Poles. This is not about 
a complete change of course and presenting Euro-enthusiastic attitudes 
without proper refl ection, as it was already done in earlier periods of 
Polish membership in the EU but, above all, about a skillful selection of 
instruments to achieve the assumed goals important from the perspective 
of Poland and the entire European Union.
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